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Abstract—Federated learning suffers from several privacy-
related issues that expose the participants to various threats.
A number of these issues are aggravated by the centralized
architecture of federated learning. In this paper, we discuss
applying federated learning on a hierarchical architecture
as a potential solution. We introduce the opportunities for
more flexible decentralized control over the training process
and its impact on the participants’ privacy. Furthermore,
we investigate possibilities to enhance the efficiency and
effectiveness of defense and verification methods.
Index Terms—Federated learning, hierarchical architecture,
privacy enhancement
1. Introduction
In recent years, data breaches have dramatically in-
creased [16]. At the same time, more services are making
use of large amounts of personal data as part of machine
learning implementations to provide value to users. These
two factors have contributed to making users of services
increasingly concerned about their privacy. The concept
of Federated Learning (FL) has been proposed to alleviate
this issue by allowing multiple users to build a joint model
without sharing their data, under the coordination of a
central server [17]. However, FL’s distributed training
process, together with its strong dependence on a central
server, have increased the attack surface against users yet
again [11]. Fully decentralized learning based on peer-
to-peer topology has been proposed to cope with the
issues associated with having a central server, such as
a performance bottleneck and a single point of failure [27].
However, the convergence time and robustness against user
churn remain open challenges.
A hierarchical architecture lies in between the two
extremes, centralized and fully decentralized architectures,
as a solution able to cope with complexity, scalability,
and failure-related issues [9]. Applying FL based on a
hierarchical architecture is referred to as Hierarchical Fed-
erated Learning (HFL). HFL naturally matches emerging
decentralized infrastructures (e.g., edge and fog computing)
and heterogeneous nature of real-world systems [13]. Most
importantly, HFL provides a unique capacity for improving
privacy. As such, it reduces the centralization of power
and control in the hands of the central server. In addition,
HFL allows flexible placement of defense and verification
methods within the hierarchy and enables these methods
to be applied more efficiently and effectively. Furthermore,
HFL creates the possibility to employ the trust between
users to mitigate a number of threats.
In this paper, we explore the potential benefits of using
HFL to address privacy-related issues currently discussed
in the FL-community. The rest of this paper is organized
as follows. In Section 2, we present FL and three of its
privacy-related issues. Then, we introduce, in Section 3,
the concept of HFL and potential applications. In Section 4,
we discuss the privacy implications of HFL. Finally, we
wrap up with a conclusion section.
2. Federated Learning and Open Issues
Federated Learning (FL) is a machine learning setting
where multiple entities (users) train a joint model. Each
user trains the model locally on their data and shares only
the model updates with a central server. The central server
aggregates the updates from the users into a new global
model. This setting mitigates a number of privacy risks that
are typically associated with conventional machine learning,
where all training data should be collected, then used to
train a model [11]. In spite of the various benefits of FL,
several privacy-related issues are still open. A number of
these issues are mainly derived from the centralized nature
of the FL architecture. Next, we describe three of these
issues, namely centralized control, limited verifiability, and
constrained defenses.
Centralized control. The server in FL plays the
role of a central coordinator that performs the following
core functions: (1) sampling users, i.e., selecting which
users participate in the training process, (2) broadcasting
the model and training algorithm, (3) aggregating the
model updates, and (4) broadcasting the updated global
model. Although such a setting limits the computational
cost for the users, it places all the control on a single
party, the server. Thus, the server potentially represents
a performance bottleneck and a single point of failure.
Furthermore, from a privacy perspective, concentrating
such functions on the server leaves the users with limited
or no control over the process. Consequently, the users have
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to rely on trusting the server to perform all the functions
correctly while maintaining best privacy practices to protect
their model updates. In this respect, if the server were to be
malicious or an adversary were to compromise the server,
various attacks could be perpetrated against the users, e.g,
reconstruction attacks [30], [33]
Limited verifiability. In FL, the server and users
perform several computations locally and share the results
with each other. The users share their updates, while the
server shares the aggregated model. In order to allow
the server and users to prove to each other that they
perform the expected computations correctly and share
a legitimate output, the computations need to be verified.
Multiple approaches based on zero-knowledge proofs have
been proposed to apply this verification [11]. However,
these approaches suffer from two main limitations. First,
the types of the proofs provided are limited (e.g., range
proofs [3]). Second, the time required for verification
grows typically exponentially with the number of users [4],
[31], which renders these approaches unscalable, and thus
unsuitable for large-scale applications. Another technique
to tackle the verification issue is to use a Trusted Execution
Environment to perform the computations [11]. However,
these environments are not widely available on user devices,
especially smartphones.
Constrained defenses. Although FL provides im-
provements for users’ privacy, it opens the door for plenty
of attacks, which can be applied by both malicious servers
and malicious users. In this work, we focus on privacy
attacks, where the attacker aims at inferring information
about users. These attacks occur in two modes: passive
and active.
• Passive attacks: The attacker observes the joint model
and periodic updates, which can be used to infer infor-
mation about other users. Shokri et al. [23] introduce
a membership inference attack using shadow models,
which can be performed in FL. Melis et al. [19] propose
a property inference attack, leveraging snapshots of the
global model. Zhou et al. [33] obtain the training data
of a target user from their shared updates (gradients).
To mitigate such attacks, several defense techniques
can be applied by the server and users. The users can
perturb their model updates before sharing them by
using one or a combination of the following methods:
(1) adding noise (e.g., local differential privacy [18]),
(2) sharing only a fraction of the updates [22], or
(3) using the dropout technique in a neural network [25].
However, these techniques usually lead to a substantial
loss of the model accuracy. That is, the trade-off between
privacy and accuracy needs to be considered [12]. On the
server side, protecting user privacy requires to break the
linkability of the individual users with their updates. To
achieve this, a secure computation can be performed, e.g,
secure aggregation [2] or secure shuffling [1]. Besides
the efficiency issues these techniques suffer from, they
hinder the server from detecting malicious updates,
creating by that an attack surface for malicious users.
• Active attacks: The attacker participates in the training
process as a user, who maliciously modifies their updates
to infer information about other users. Hitaj et al. [8] pro-
pose a reconstruction attack where the attacker provokes
the target user to overfit the model on their training
data. Melis et al. [19] present a property inference
attack based on multi-task learning. Nasr et al. [20]
use gradient ascent to perform a membership inference
attack. To detect and mitigate such attacks, several meth-
ods can be considered, such as anomaly detectors [21],
median-based aggregation [32], trimmed mean [32],
and redundancy-based encoding [6]. However, some
of these methods require accessing the individual user
updates [21], which is impeded by secure aggregation.
In addition, the heavy computations and uncertainty of
convergence remain main limitations [5].
3. Hierarchical Federated Learning
FL is, by definition, coordinated by a central server [11].
We relax this definition to apply FL within a hierarchical
architecture and refer to it as Hierarchical Federated
Learning (HFL). A restricted version of HFL, considering
only three layers, has been presented in [13]–[15]. However,
privacy was not considered a prime goal. In HFL, there
is one root server, connected to multiple group servers,
which are organized in a tree structure (see Figure 1).
The lowest layer of group servers connects to users (data
owners), which are clustered in user groups. The hierarchy
can contain multiple layers of group servers and can
be unbalanced such that different branches vary in their
number of layers. The users send their model updates to the
upper layer to be aggregated by the corresponding group
servers. The aggregation process continues in multiple
stages (on each layer) towards the root server. Every
two subsequent layers can have a different number of
communication (aggregating) rounds before pushing their
models to the upper layer. After aggregation, the global
model is forwarded along the hierarchy downwards to the
users.
From an abstract perspective, a hierarchy is a hybrid
solution between centralized and fully decentralized archi-
tectures. On the one hand, a hierarchy can cope with the
scalability and failure tolerance limitations of centralized
architectures. That is evidenced by the existence and active
operation of hierarchical architectures within complex,
large-scale systems such as the Internet [26]. On the other
hand, a hierarchy helps to tackle the management chal-
lenges encountered in fully decentralized architectures. We
can observe this advantage in the organizational structure
of companies [9].
FL was originally proposed with the intention to be
based on a cloud computing infrastructure [17]. Such
centralized infrastructure represents a network bottleneck,
especially with the increase of resource-constrained devices
(e.g., smartphones and IoT sensors). To alleviate this issue,
there is a trend towards decentralized computing infras-
Figure 1. Example of Hierarchical Federated Learning architecture.
tructures (e.g., edge and fog computing) [7], which are
introducing hierarchies in communication and computing
architectures. HFL represents a natural step in extending
FL into such emerging infrastructures.
Online social networks represent yet another appli-
cation where the system architecture matches with HFL.
Motivated by privacy-related issues, more decentralized
social networks are emerging [29]. Diaspora and Mastodon
are two of the most popular, which leverage the concept
of local servers. Users can choose which local server to
connect to and where to store their data. This architecture
represents a hierarchy where some functions are delegated
to the higher-layer servers. In contrast, privacy-related
functions (e.g., data storage) are pushed down in the
hierarchy to local servers and users.
4. Privacy Implications of HFL
In this section, we discuss the implications of HFL in
relation to the privacy-related issues of Section 2.
Centralized control. In FL, the distribution of
functions between the server and users is unbalanced;
the control is concentrated on the server. In contrast, HFL
allows different FL functions to be distributed throughout
the hierarchy to the group servers and users, which helps
to overcome the performance bottleneck and single point
of failure typically found in FL. This is because the group
servers can use the local aggregated models within the
hierarchy until they converge on the root server at the top.
Next, we introduce alternative placements for each of the
FL functions.
• Sampling users: In FL, the server selects the users to
participate in the training process [17]. A malicious
server could misuse this privilege to attack specific
users [30]. In contrast, HFL allows sampling to be
performed in multiple stages, where a lower layer is
sampled by the upper one, till the top. This can cope
with the gap of trust between the users and server in
FL, since each two subsequent layers in HFL are more
likely to have a better base for trust and accountability.
In fog computing, users can be sampled by edge devices,
which can be, for instance, a router in the neighborhood.
In decentralized social networks, the local server, which
is chosen by the users, can perform sampling. Also,
users can apply privacy-preserving distributed sampling
algorithms, such as Anonymous Random Walk used
in [28].
• Broadcasting the training algorithm and model: Con-
gzheng et al. [24] have shown that malicious training
algorithms can leak information about the training data.
To address this issue in HFL, the group servers can
be seen as a protective layer where the algorithms are
inspected and verified before being pushed to the users.
From an efficiency perspective, HFL provides the possi-
bility for the group servers to adapt the training process
to suit the resources of their users’ devices, e.g., by
adjusting the hyper-parameters of the algorithm or by
broadcasting a fraction of the model (sub-model). In FL,
training a sub-model by the users can reveal information
about their data to the server [11], while in HFL dividing
the model to sub-models can happen in different phases
through the layers such that an upper layer is not aware
how or whether the lower layer divides the model further.
• Aggregating the model updates: As opposed to FL,
where the aggregation is conducted only by the server,
in HFL, multiple levels of aggregation occur according
to the number of layers in the hierarchy. This aggre-
gation scheme implies that only the lowest layer of
group servers receive individual updates from users,
while all the upper layers process aggregated updates.
Consequently, the need for secure aggregation in the
upper layers is reduced, which can be interpreted to
a performance improvement. In addition, the cascade
aggregation process helps to protect the identities of the
users from the higher-layer servers.
• Broadcasting the updated global model: Some privacy
attacks in FL require distributing a poisoned model
to the target users [8]. The flat topology at the users
level in FL allows this type of attacks easy access.
While HFL provides the possibility to control the model
dissemination more effectively through the multiple
layers. In case a poisoned model were to be detected
within the hierarchy, the group servers could refrain
from pushing it to the users.
Limited verifiability. The poor scalability of the
verification methods in FL (e.g., [4], [31]) hinders their
deployment in large-scale applications. In HFL, verifying
the updates of the users can be performed by the corre-
sponding group servers. Grouping users in comparably
small groups reduces the computational overhead on the
group servers and makes the deployment of verification
methods more feasible.
Constrained defenses. Most of the defense meth-
ods in FL come with the cost of lower model accuracy [22],
considerable computational overhead [32], or both [6]. HFL
provides the possibility to apply these methods in a more
flexible manner. For instance, applying different methods
in different parts of the hierarchy, such that not all the
users suffer from a heavy loss in accuracy nor have to
perform costly computations.
As the upper layers in HFL process only aggregated
models, not individual users’ updates, the necessity of
secure aggregation can be reduced or even eliminated in
these layers. This can lead to a performance improvement
and allows applying anomaly detection methods (e.g., [21])
to detect malicious models received from lower layers.
Detecting a malicious model from a specific group server
can be followed by excluding that server from further
aggregation rounds while maintaining the training pro-
cess functioning normally in the rest of the hierarchy.
Furthermore, the affected server can be notified about
its malicious model so it can take more computational
expensive countermeasures (e.g., [32]) in their local user
group.
Unlike FL, HFL allows leveraging the trust between
users as an additional line of defense. In social networks,
grouping users based on trusted graphs [10] can reduce
the probability of attacks within groups, as it is assumed
to be more difficult for malicious users to break into the
groups. Consequently, users may relax their local defenses
(e.g., reduce the noise added locally) to achieve a model
with higher accuracy. At the same time, the group servers
can take the responsibility of protecting their groups from
attacks across groups by applying specific defense methods
(e.g., adding noise to the aggregated updates).
5. Conclusion
In this work, we presented a number of privacy-related
issues in Federated Learning (FL), such as centralized
control and constrained defenses. We discussed how
Hierarchical Federated Learning (HFL) can potentially
address these issues. HFL utilizes an architecture that
lies between the centralized (FL) and fully decentralized
learning and comes with a series of privacy advantages.
HFL enables high flexibility in functionality distribution,
which facilitates known defense and verification methods.
HFL allows leveraging the trust between the participants
in different application scenarios to mitigate several threats.
Based on this contribution, we wish to encourage further
research into the direction of HFL to unlock its full
potential.
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